

NSDD 51 HAS BEEN RESCINDED/SUPERSEDED BY

NSD 59

NSC Review Complete as Redacted.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	✓			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	Nic/AL-LOW		✓		
20	C/ACIS		✓		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

6/22/84

Date

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SYSTEM II.

90709

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 21, 1984

Executive Registry

84- 2677

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: Conference on Disarmament Mandate on Nuclear Testing
Limitations (C)

The President has decided that within the policy context described below, the U.S. Government is prepared to accept the reestablishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with a mandate as proposed by the CD Western Group as follows:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the final document, the Conference on Disarmament decides to reestablish an ad hoc committee under Item 1 of its Agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban.'

"The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to resume its substantive examination of specific issues relating to a Comprehensive Test Ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject.

"The Conference also requests the Ad Hoc Committee to examine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing, and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system.

"The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1984 session. The Conference will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard." (S)

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The decision to accept the above mandate does not represent a change in fundamental U.S. policy on nuclear testing limitations with regard to a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). This policy, as set forth in NSDD-51, is that because the security of the United States and our Allies depends upon a nuclear deterrent and because of concerns about verification problems and security asymmetries, the U.S. should not resume CTB negotiations at this time. As stated in NSDD-51, U.S. policy continues to endorse a CTB as a long-term objective in the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, and improved verification capabilities, and at a time when nuclear deterrent is no longer as essential an element, as currently, for international security and stability. NSDD-51 also authorized continued discussion of verification and compliance issues in the Conference on Disarmament. (S)

The U.S. has taken this decision in the expectation that every possible step will be taken by Allies to ensure that this mandate will be retained at least through 1985, and that, at the same time, they will seek to ensure a productive Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We will also expect our friends and Allies to ensure that the scope of any Conference on Disarmament work in the nuclear testing area be focused first on completing a thorough examination of the considerable verification and compliance issues. (S)

Based on a number of discussions with the Australians, we expect them to take the lead in this effort. To this end, the Secretary of State will raise our concerns on this issue, with a view toward gaining Australian agreement to oppose any further evolution of the mandate until the Ad Hoc Committee has completed a thorough examination of the considerable verification and compliance issues involved. (S)

To assure appropriate Conference on Disarmament discussion of the verification and compliance issues on which we wish the mandate to focus, the Nuclear Testing Limitations Interdepartmental Group will prepare by July 27, 1984 a paper outlining the proposed strategy for handling these issues in future discussions in that forum. In addition to delineating a proposed general approach for such discussion, the paper should provide a detailed elaboration of the specific verification and compliance concerns involved. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

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